Jonas Cederlöf

PHD CANDIDATE · DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS · UPPSALA UNIVERSITY · jonas.cederlof@nek.uu.se

I’m a Ph.D candidate in economics at Uppsala University and affiliated with the UCLS.

My main research interests lies in policy relevant questions, first and foremost within labor and public economics. I also have a special interest in both applied and theoretical econometrics.

I will be on the Job Market and be available for interviews at the EEA meeting in Rotterdam and the ASSA meeting in San Diego.

Research interests: Labor economics, Applied econometrics, Public economics


Job Market paper

Saved by Seniority? - Effects of Displacement for Workers at the Margin of Layoff

This paper takes a novel approach to estimating the effects of involuntary job loss on future earnings, wages and employment. Whereas the previous literature has relied on mass layoffs and plant closures for exogenous variation in displacement, I use the fact that who is laid off is often determined by a seniority rule, specifically the last-in-first-out (LIFO) rule. This feature enables me to study also smaller sized layoffs affecting a broader set of workers. Using matched employer-employee data from Sweden, in combination with detailed individual-level data on layoff notifications, I rank workers according to relative seniority and identify establishment/occupation specific discontinuities in the probability of displacement which I exploit in a regression discontinuity framework. I find that displaced workers on average suffer large initial earnings losses of about 38 percent, but in contrast to previous studies, earnings recover fully within 7 years. I then exploit the heterogeneity across layoffs to examine when, and under what circumstances, the cost of displacement are most persistent. I show that persistent earnings losses are mainly associated with very large layoff events and that a substantive share of these losses are attributable to general equilibrium effects.


Research

Saved by Seniority? - Effects of Displacement for Workers at the Margin of Layoff

This paper takes a novel approach to estimating the effects of involuntary job loss on future earnings, wages and employment. Whereas the previous literature has relied on mass layoffs and plant closures for exogenous variation in displacement, I use the fact that who is laid off is often determined by a seniority rule, specifically the last-in-first-out (LIFO) rule. This feature enables me to study also smaller sized layoffs affecting a broader set of workers. Using matched employer-employee data from Sweden, in combination with detailed individual-level data on layoff notifications, I rank workers according to relative seniority and identify establishment/occupation specific discontinuities in the probability of displacement which I exploit in a regression discontinuity framework. I find that displaced workers on average suffer large initial earnings losses of about 38 percent, but in contrast to previous studies, earnings recover fully within 7 years. I then exploit the heterogeneity across layoffs to examine when, and under what circumstances, the cost of displacement are most persistent. I show that persistent earnings losses are mainly associated with very large layoff events and that a substantive share of these losses are attributable to general equilibrium effects.

How does advance layoff notice affect the labor market prospects for workers

Layoff rules are often criticized for creating an inefficient allocation of labor. However, such rules also provide insurance for workers. This paper examines the effects of advance notice of job loss for workers. Empirically, we use unique administrative data from Sweden on the exact dates of layoff notification as well as contracted notice periods, all at the individual-level. Discontinuities in notification times generated by employment legislation or collective bargaining agreements provide exogenous variation. Our regression-discontinuity estimates indicate that longer notice periods reduce the probability of non-employment and increase annual earnings during the first year after layoff notification. Workers who get longer notification periods experience smaller falls in their reemployment wages. We also show that firms make – and workers accept – severance payments in order to reduce the notice period. Workers who are eligible for higher UI get lower severance payments

Extended Unemployment Benefits and the Hazard to Employment

Previous studies estimating the effect of generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration has found that as job-seekers approach benefit exhaustion the probability of leaving unemployment increases sharply. Such ``spikes'' in the hazard rate has generally been interpreted as shirking among job-seekers timing their employment to coincide with benefit exhaustion. This, however, has been called into question by Card et al. (2007b) who claim that such spikes rather reflect flight out of the labor force as benefits run out. This paper revisits this debate by studying a 30 week UI benefit extension in Sweden and its effects on unemployment duration, duration on UI as well as the timing of employment. As the UI extension is predicated upon a job-seeker having a child below the age of 18 at the time of regular UI exhaustion this provides quasi-experimental variation which I exploit using a regression discontinuity design. I find that although increasing potential UI duration by 30 weeks increases actual take up by about 2.7 weeks, overall duration in unemployment and the probability of employment is largely unaffected. Moreover, I find no evidence of job-seekers manipulating the hazard to employment such that it coincides with UI benefit exhaustion.

Caseworkers – do they matter, why, and for whom? Exploring caseworker value-added using random variation

[Email for draft]

This paper studies the importance of caseworkers for job seeker outcomes. We exploit that many local employment offices in Sweden assign job seekers to caseworkers based on date-of-birth. This random allocation mechanism coupled with unique data on caseworkers allow us to provide new and credible evidence on the performance of caseworkers, as well as mechanisms explaining caseworker value-added. We find that caseworkers matter; a one standard deviation increase in the distribution of caseworker fixed effects increase the 6-months job finding rate by 7 percent, and earnings after three years by 4.8 percent. Interestingly, observed caseworker characteristics, such as cognitive and non-cognitive ability, caseworker experience, employment and unemployment history, and educational attainment, can not explain caseworker performance. The results suggest that it does not matter much who the caseworkers are, but rather, what they do, and how they are matched to job seekers. In particular, caseworkers who conduct many meetings, and caseworkers who tailor training programs to the most appropriate job seekers, have better outcomes. These strategies matter most for job seekers less attached to the labor market. We also find that similarity matters; caseworkers matched to job seekers with the same gender, similar employment history or similar educational background, perform better.

Current projcets

Who Are the Early Leavers? Selection on Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills Prior to Mass Layoff (with Peter Fredriksson and David Seim)
Marginal treatment effects of labor market traning programs using random variation (with Johan Vikström)
Do unemployment affect intra-household decisions? (with Stefano Lombardi and Johan Vikström)
Starting Anew - The Consequences of Personal Default for Highly Indebted Individuals

Curriculum Vitae


Resources

BibTex

Stata Snippets

Gsample - Sampling by group
Fastmax - 20 times faster then egen =max()

Contact