Jonas Cederlöf

Phd Economics · IFAU · University of Edinburgh · jonas.cederlof@ed.ac.uk

I am a researcher at IFAU and a lecturer (assistant professor) at the School of Economics, University of Edinburgh (currently part-time). I am also affiliated with the Uppsala Center for Labor Studies. I defended my PhD thesis Job Loss: Consequences and Labor Market Policy at Uppsala University for which I received an honorable mention in the Upjohn Institute Dissertation Award and The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Arnbergska Prize.

My main research interests lies first and foremost within labor economics and applied econometrics. My current research focuses on questions revolving around job loss; its consequences for individual workers and how various labor market polices could be used and affect subsequent labor market outcomes for workers.

Research interests: Labor economics, Applied econometrics, Public economics


Job Market paper

Reconsidering the Cost of Job Loss: Evidence from Redundancies and Mass Layoffs

(Revision in progress)   [Working Paper]   [Slides]

This paper studies the consequences of job loss for workers, and explores differences in the cost of displacement using a novel research design. While the previous literature relies on mass layoffs and plant closures for identification, I exploit discontinuities in the likelihood of displacement generated by a last-in-first-out (LIFO) rule used at layoffs in Sweden. Matching data on individual layoff notifications to administrative records, I find that permanent earnings losses are present only among workers who lose their job during mass layoffs, whereas workers displaced in smaller layoffs fully recover within 7 years. The finding is robust to differences in overall economic conditions as well as industry and worker composition. Auxiliary analysis suggests that mass layoffs affect the entire local labor market thereby amplifying the effect of displacement.


Research

Reconsidering the Cost of Job Loss: Evidence from Redundancies and Mass Layoffs

This paper studies the consequences of job loss for workers, and explores differences in the cost of displacement using a novel research design. While the previous literature relies on mass layoffs and plant closures for identification, I exploit discontinuities in the likelihood of displacement generated by a last-in-first-out (LIFO) rule used at layoffs in Sweden. Matching data on individual layoff notifications to administrative records, I find that permanent earnings losses are present only among workers who lose their job during mass layoffs, whereas workers displaced in smaller layoffs fully recover within 7 years. The finding is robust to differences in overall economic conditions as well as industry and worker composition. Auxiliary analysis suggests that mass layoffs affect the entire local labor market thereby amplifying the effect of displacement.

Mandatory advance notice of layoff: Evidence and efficiency considerations

Coverage : RJ

We investigate a prevalent, but understudied, employment protection policy: mandatory advance notice (MN), requiring employers to notify employees of forthcoming layoffs. MN increases future production, as notified workers search on the job, but reduces current production as they supply less effort. Our theoretical model captures this trade-off and predicts that MN improves production efficiency by increasing information sharing, whereas large production losses can be avoided by worker-firm agreements on side-payments – severance pay – in lieu of MN. We provide evidence of such severance increases in response to an extension of MN using novel Swedish administrative data. We then estimate the production gain of MN: extending the MN period leads to shorter non-employment duration and higher reemployment wages, plausibly driven by on-the-job search. Using variation in notice duration across firms, we estimate the productivity loss of notice. The estimates of benefits and costs suggest that MN has a positive net impact on production, offering an empirically-grounded efficiency argument for mandating notice.

What makes a good caseworker?

How do caseworkers affect job finding and what characterizes a productive caseworker? To answer this question we exploit variation coming from the fact that many local employment offices in Sweden assign job seekers to caseworkers based on their date of birth. We couple this identification strategy with fine-grained administrative data on both caseworkers and job seekers. Estimation of caseworker fixed effects reveals sizable variation in overall caseworker value-added. Female caseworkers perform better than male caseworkers and caseworkers with two years of experience outperform caseworkers with less experience. Cognitive ability and personal experience of unemployment are not related to caseworker perfor mance. Based on the actions taken by the caseworkers we show that caseworker strategies are important. Analyses of caseworker–job seeker matching show that matching based on previous labor market experiences or gender leads to better outcomes.

Extended Unemployment Benefits and the Hazard to Employment

Previous studies estimating the effect of generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration has found that as job-seekers approach benefit exhaustion the probability of leaving unemployment increases sharply. Such ``spikes'' in the hazard rate has generally been interpreted as shirking among job-seekers timing their employment to coincide with benefit exhaustion. This, however, has been called into question by Card et al. (2007b) who claim that such spikes rather reflect flight out of the labor force as benefits run out. This paper revisits this debate by studying a 30 week UI benefit extension in Sweden and its effects on unemployment duration, duration on UI as well as the timing of employment. As the UI extension is predicated upon a job-seeker having a child below the age of 18 at the time of regular UI exhaustion this provides quasi-experimental variation which I exploit using a regression discontinuity design. I find that although increasing potential UI duration by 30 weeks increases actual take up by about 2.7 weeks, overall duration in unemployment and the probability of employment is largely unaffected. Moreover, I find no evidence of job-seekers manipulating the hazard to employment such that it coincides with UI benefit exhaustion.

Current projcets

Who Are the Early Leavers? Selection on Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills Prior to Mass Layoff (with Peter Fredriksson and David Seim)
Marginal treatment effects of labor market traning programs using random variation (with Johan Vikström)
How much should we trust mass layoff estimates?

Curriculum Vitae


Resources

Student Material

BibTex

Stata Snippets

Gsample - Sampling by group
Fastmax - 20 times faster then egen =max()

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